This post essentially follows on from the Notes on Kant post by David, which having prompted rather a lot of comments and one or two conversations, led to a few interesting conclusions on the subject of morality. Here, however, I mainly intend to express my own views and conclusions on the nature of morals (though David seems to be of much accordance, at least in his end point). I’ll leave it to anyone who wishes to comment to counter my points.
To start, I should mention that my own philosophy on morals seems to be largely in accordance with rule utilitarianism (or at a minor variant of it). What follows is pretty much the set of ideas that guided me to the eventual conclusion regarding optimality. Specifically, I argue that an action is moral if it is beneficial to either oneself or society (or both) and not detrimental to the well-being and continuation of the society as a whole. The intentions of the individual performing the action must also satisfy these conditions if the action is to be deemed moral, else the action must be morally neutral at best. Importantly, this specification implies that choices made with self-interest in mind can be moral so long as the communal benefit is non-negative. This becomes quite obvious given the assumption that the well-being of individuals in general contributes to the well-being of society (at least in an indirect way). Note that the arbiter in all these cases must be hypothetical as well as purely objective (nature itself, if you will), meaning that even though a certain action may be considered immoral as a consensus of society, it may nevertheless be neutral or even moral in actuality. Saying this, in a well-functioning and successful society, there would seem to be a general requirement that the judgement of moral worth of actions is reasonably accurate in a high proportion of situations.
Considering these points and their commonalities is primarily what led me to believe that when you boil everything down, morals are nothing but an approximation to optimality of society. Now as soon one mentions optimality, the question of a measure automatically follows. Of course, most people probably have some vague notion of what an “optimal society” is, but since the aim here is to be as formal and specific as possible, I really need to define a cost function, at least in loose terms. At this point, I would imagine that the opinions of most people would tend to diverge rapidly. Some would reason that the cost function is purely dependant on well-being/happiness/pleasure (whether more for the individual or society separates the hedonists from the utilitarians), while others would state the straightforward biological (yet to many cold and unpleasing) view that optimality is but a measure of the size of the population and thus the continued ability to self-replicate. Finally, the more religious among us might contend that optimality is simply the perfectly obedient following of teachings passed down to us by God. In essence, this cost function is nothing other than the “meaning of life” (in the widest possible sense) – something that may never be defined, and certainly not a discussion I’m going to include in this post! Whatever view people wish to take, I believe that the basic statement that “morals are an approximation for optimality” holds well in all cases. Like the nature of this optimality, the mechanism by which the concept of morality has been instilled in us (evolution, creationism, Spinoza’s God, or whatever) is also open to debate, but nonetheless is not able invalidate this theory in itself, at least in the way I see it. Yet all these concepts of optimality surely do have similarities. Another important feature of the cost function is that parameters should be not only the current state of humanity and the world, but also the states at points in the future (perhaps stretching infinitely far ahead in time). In the end, I think I can say that I do personally feel reasonably content with this definition of morals (albeit most likely an incomplete one). In my mind one cannot proceed any further in a formal definition without invoking reasons akin to the “meaning of life” such as those just mentioned – all very contentious or speculative and therefore not terribly helpful as bases for any fundamental theories, in my view.
It is without doubt important to stress that morals have their own imperfections and limitations, like analytical reasoning, and depend on the individuals (or society thereof) in which they have formed. Yet depending on how you look at it, morals have evolved or been designed specifically for the purpose of optimal society. Although morality may be less adaptable than intelligence (at least over the timespans ranging from days to maybe lifetimes), it assuredly has a more “tailored” purpose, and therefore has its place alongside, and arguably ahead of, analytical reasoning.
If I were to now summarise how I believe optimal behaviour should be guided, I would say that it’s necessary to be somewhat careful not to propose something too uncompromisable. In reality, it’s almost always the case that reasons are more intricate and subtle than immediately apparent. In stating an emphasis on paying due attention to intrinsic morals (loosely, which can be recognised as principles and codes that typically “feel right” and are “seen to be right” by consensus of society), and contrarily wariness in ignoring these morals in favour of some sort of pure reasoning. “Reasoning”, after all, when performed by humans, cannot help but be intruded by egotistical motives, among other notable imperfections. Do we not after all have a fear of so-called purely “rational” or “logical” machines not hesitating to perform tasks that are undeniably immoral in the eyes of man (if not only founded in science fiction and our imaginations)?
As a quick final note, I ought to mention that nowhere in my musings have I required morals to be static in nature. Equally, there would not seem to be any issue with them being unchangeable. At this point I’m further tempted to divide morals into two categories: intrinsic and social. Again, this is a matter on which I’m only going to lightly touch. The latter is the one of particular interest in that it could imply a varying cost function for optimality. It also suggests a mutual feedback cycle between the will of society and contemporary moral values (with analytical reasoning somewhere in the process, potentially acting both positively or negatively).
Right, so this post has wound on long enough by now, and is only getting increasingly vague and leaving more loose ends. Still, I hope that I’ve at least partially conveyed my theories and general impressions on the subject. I’m not sure how everything appears to others who haven’t followed the continuous discussion on the wider topic (largely originating with David’s post). I’d certainly be keen to hear what anyone else thinks on the subject and the ideas presented here. I would not at all be surprised to receive opinions that this relation of morals to optimality seems distasteful or even incomplete to many people. Indeed, I am not sure that I am wholly satisfied with this explanation as the “root” of morals. (How can I, having already cynically accepted the fallibility of human rationalisation?) Maybe it is as a student of physics that I realise our theories of the nature, physical or human, are always but approximations to a more profound reality.
It finally appeared!
To continue my traditional technique of adding plenty of disclaimers to the start of a post, I’ve been awake for less than an hour and should be on my way to the library. I haven’t had chance to reread the other posts, so what I’m saying here is probably completely different to what I was saying before. In a couple of days I’ll write something longer and more thought out, but these were my first few thoughts:
“I would argue that an action is moral if it is beneficial to either oneself or society (or both) and not detrimental to the well-being and continuation of the society as a whole.”
What happens when what is optimal for society now prevents members of society from participating later on and having their optimality included in the general consideration? In the long term, this clearly isn’t optimal for society, but in the short term it may appear to be. This is the general reasoning for rule-utilitarianism (that there needs to be basic presumptions of what is and isn’t allowed already in place), as well as the basis for many pro-human rights/anti-majoritarianism arguments.
“Note that the arbiter in all these cases must be purely objective (nature itself, perhaps), meaning that even though a certain action may be considered immoral as a consensus of society, it may nevertheless be neutral or even moral in fact.”
How do you find the perfectly objective arbiter? I’m rather sceptical about the fact that any person could be entirely neutral (I apply this to judges too, by the way). Habermas (my current passion) had a theory that by forming the perfect discussion between every member of society you could come up with societal truths, and this would be as close as you could get to objectivity. He then went on to point out that this perfect discussion is impossible. My point is that I think we can aim to be perfectly objective, but I don’t think we’ll get there. This comes back to my continuing discussion on progress, which is another thing I’ll write about at some point.
“In essence, this cost function is nothing other than the “meaning of life” – something that may never be defined, and certainly not a discussion I’m going to include in this post.”
This makes me smile. I’m almost sure that any philosophical debate gets back to the meaning of life at some point. In fact, I’m completely sure it does, as this is the big unknown that means that we’re still debating and haven’t come up with all the answers yet/won’t ever come up with all the answers.
If I’d thought about it, I would have told you about the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy before. Whoops.
“The next question is: does there exist any better approximation to optimality than morality?”
I think if you start trying to determine optimal conditions for society without going through morality first, you get into politics. Or at least political philosophy (as opposed to current affairs). It also starts to look more ‘neutral’ than morality is morality begins to be perceived as something fixed and as a divider between groups of people.
“Is there a point at which we as a species may become intelligent enough to produce a more optimal society purely by reasoning?”
Going back to Kant, this is what he meant by his Kingdom of Ends, one of the definitions of the Categorical Imperative. The basic idea is that in reasoning people are treated as ends rather than means to an end, but in general he is meaning a society that is based on purely objective reasoning for what is best for society itself, rather than its individual members. He also thought we’d never reach this, but it’s something we should aim for.
“Surely no-one would argue that high-level reasoning can’t be used alongside (augment, if you like) instinctual/inherent morals”
For Mills, this *was* morals; instinctual/inherent morals were rules picked up from n generations of experience before us. Inherent morals come from either high-level reasoning or experience, but for the sake of efficiency we’ve internalised them as rules, without the explanations behind them. Other philosophers see inherent morals simply as ‘the yuck factor’, and then try to walk all over it.
At some point after exams I’ll re-read, Kant, the conversation on David’s blog, and all of this, but that’ll take some time (and will probably descend into ‘why civil and political rights are optimal for society’). In the meantime, I’ve linked to David’s post on my blog, do you mind if I do the same with this one?
“Now to properly justify this theory, I ought to explain in more detail what I mean by an “approximation” to morality. In my conclusion, I came to realise that morality may not lead to optimality in all cases, however you define the term. Clearly, there can exist an action performed at a certain time that to the best of everyone’s knowledge appeared moral, yet had long-term ramifications that were generally negative – an unlikely case perhaps, but a possible one regardless.”
I think this point of “I didn’t know it would do that!” is the reason why I always write “expected” all over the place: It’s only possible to make choices which are optimal given your knowledge, and you can’t see into the future, so you have to do some probability and determine the expected utility/cost given each of your proposed actions (for example: the taxi driver who took me off my bike behaved optimally because he had no way of knowing that I was coming down the hill without lights, and if he didn’t move then he would never get anywhere.)
“In then follows that either a) the action cannot actually be considered moral because of these consequences in the distant future,… I would think option a would appear immediately quite wrong, since it would contradict the idea that moral actions can be knowingly perform, which is just silliness.”
Not *quite* sure what you mean. Read the rest of my reply, and see if I contradict what you mean.
“We are then forced to accept option b: that morals are only approximation guides to optimal behaviour and therefore optimal results (though most likely very good approximations). The next question is: does there exist any better approximation to optimality than morality? Of course, omniscience combined with perfect reasoning might be considered the ideal way to produce an optimal society and would most definitely better morals, but this is something which we as humans fall short of by an effectively infinite margin.”
Yeah, I always forget that option when I’m thinking of optimal behaviour. I guess that if we’re going to outline what optimal behaviour is, we could try each of the following approaches, in order:
1) Use omniscience + perfect reason to determine the outcome after each of our proposed actions. (obviously impossible)
2) Take into account our constraint of imperfect knowledge, and try to infer the probability of good/bad outcomes by using our experience in the world, and use our cost function to work out what the utility/cost of each outcome would be, and then use these to work out the expected utility/cost (sum of P_i * C_i). (act utilitarianism: if we have infinite brainpower, this is the most “optimal” course of action we can hope to achieve. Turns out we don’t though)
3) Find some kind of approximate rule, which stops us from having to evaluate all possible outcomes of all possible actions when evaluating expected utility (“If I follow this rule, then the expected utility is higher than if I don’t, therefore I will follow this rule”). (This is what I have in mind when I think of moral rules like the 10 commandments, or reciprocation.)
The point which then needs to be explored is which forms of cost function lend themselves to which forms of approximate rule, and is it possible to infer anything about our cost function based on our set of intrinsic morals. I think I will see if I can write a post of this form.
“Perhaps we can even attribute immoral behaviour, when not absence of moral guidance from onself/society, to the arrogance or egoism (see later discussion) of humans with regards to their intelligence, and their failure to realise its limitations in forseeing complex (even relatively simple) consequences.”
egotism, an excessive or exaggerated sense of self-importance: common spelling mistake, and misapprehension that it is egoism[1]. –wikipedia
“From here I don’t think it’s a long jump to conclude that morals are, at their roots, “approximations” or “shortcuts” to optimal behaviour for the society as well as (in most cases) oneself.”
I don’t like jumps. Kant makes a lot of them, and whenever he makes one, he seems to add half a dozen extra (unstated) assumptions, which limit the applicability of his results.
““Reasoning”, after all, when performed by humans, cannot help but be intruded by egotistical motives. Do we not after all have a fear of so-called purely “rational” or “logical” machines not hesitating to perform tasks undeniably immoral in the eyes of man, if not only in science fiction and our imaginations?”
It’s interesting that you seem to say morals are a way to approximate optimality, but reason isn’t. Have I grasped the wrong end of the stick?
To me, the act utilitarianism approach uses perfect reason and imperfect knowledge to approximate optimality. I would also argue that all morals should be possible to justify using reason in a similar way (“if I follow this moral rule, I will on average increase the value of my utility function compared to not following it.”). If morals are approximately optimal decision rules, then they should increase the expected utility.
(Note that I have changed from using “my expected utility” to “the expected utility”. While everyone is allowed to use a different utility function, phrasing it as “my” seems to imply ignorance of others, which many people don’t seem to like.)
(14:55:37) alsuren: *internally does s/egotism/selfishness/g throughout the rest of the paragraph*
(15:21:22) alsuren: “Drawing all the previously mentioned things together, I feel I can now justify my definition of morality as an “approximation” or “shortcut” to optimal behaviour for the species as a whole.” –surely in the religious case, morals *are* optimality?
(15:22:43) Alex: god’s will is optimality
(15:23:10) Alex: morals are only our guide
I think that’s fair enough.
I will definitely be posting my next post (giving concrete examples of cost functions, and the emergent moral rules) under the same title as yours though.
I don’t like defining right and wrong in terms of good/bad consequences because there might be times when you have two choices: Do something harmful, or do something less harmful. In other words, this thinking encourages a guilty conscience to someone who has no choice but to cause harm. To some extent that’s everyone.
I agree that ethics seems to be about “maximizing good.” (You can still maximize good when you have two bad options to choose from.) However, that need not be about society only. What about animals? Don’t they count? (We tend to live our lives more harmful to animals than beneficial to others. Does that mean we should feel guilty?)
Hi James,
Your view on the definition of morality in terms of the consequences of actions is not an uncommon one – it tends to be one of the main objections to utilitarianism, as far as I know. I would however argue that this sort of thinking doesn’t encourage a guilty conscience. “Guilty consciences” are either deserved to seem degree (in the case that the moral agent has in hindsight realised a poor moral decision) or quite often unjustified (in the case you pointed out, i.e. choosing the “lesser of two evils”). My response would simply be that the latter situation is just a natural consequence of the fact even the best descisions can sometimes be in part morally detrimental. Perhaps it is even a human flaw, though I would tend to think not, since a *small* but undeserved sense of guilt (accompanied by a realisation that the agent nonetheless made a moral decision) would not be too harmful and would only make the agent more aware of their actions.
The point that morality is not only about society is a fair one. I considered the same thing myself after writing this post (but haven’t gotten around to updating it yet). Cautiously, I might widen “society” to “nature” (living beings) or even “the universe” (which is easier to define) for this reason.
This is really a little more than just guilty conscience. How can we avoid seeing the person who had to cause harm as anything but morally blameworthy? The action committed was “wrong” or “bad,” even though the best decision might be made.
Perhaps some of this can be avoided by adding an “ought implies can” principal. We only ought not to do harm if we can avoid doing so, and so forth.
In such circumstances, it is only human fallacy that makes us see “the lesser evil” as morally blameworthy. You could even say it is a natural instinct for us, and more often than not a correct one (else it would not have come to exist, in my view). Moreover, I would be inclined to believe that all rational humans would in many cases be able to realise the best option, despite any (relatively small) negative effects, given time and hindsight. Of course, it is quite unlikely in the first place that a person will be able to make an important decision against the moral consenus of society at the time, so one can only suppose that such situations are rather rare (though not exceedingly so). A particular individual with great foresight is of limited use to humanity if others lack it, except in the odd case. Yet importantly, it is this same “rule” that means that madmen with “foresight” do not dominate others. Objective moral decisions are only theoretical ideals, and a large society acts as a sort of balance to filter out extraordinarily wise or horrific views of “morality”.
Part of my argument is that both morals and the powers of human reasoning are clearly imperfect, so that the most optimal decisions can at the best of times can only *purposely* be made within the limits that moral consensus, the capability of human intelligence, and the state of the world allow.
Now I’m not sure I completely understand what you mean by your “ought implies can” principal. It sounds like it works along a separate line of reasoning to my argument, though there could be some links.
Well, thanks for your comments anyway. It’s always nice to have additional interesting opinions.
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